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Resumo
Reconstruções Radicais: Uma Analogia Crítica 
do State‑building Pós‑conflito Americano
As questões relacionadas com o State‑building em 
situações pós‑conflito têm dominado muitos dos 
debates contemporâneos nas Relações Interna‑
cionais. Porém, as experiências de state‑building 
não são um fenómeno recente. O presente artigo 
estabelece uma analogia entre a actual experiên‑
cia americana com o state‑building no Iraque e o 
esforço de reconstrução dos estados do Sul no 
período a seguir à Guerra Civil americana. O 
objectivo principal do exercício é tentar identificar 
semelhanças e diferenças nas dinâmicas envolvi‑
das em ambos os casos. A observação demonstra 
que ambos os projectos de reconstrução não 
visavam restaurar a ordem política previamente 
existente. Pelo contrário, as experiências seculares 
de state‑building por parte dos EUA têm culmi‑
nado na institucionalização de uma agenda de 
transformação radical das ordens política, social 
e económicas existentes. Tanto a Reconstrução 
Radical no Sul como a guerra no Iraque podem 
ser melhor compreendidas no quadro no projecto 
contemporâneo de construção da paz, englobado 
dentro do desígnio do state‑building liberal.
Abstract
Post‑conflict state‑building has been at the heart of 
contemporary debates in IR. However, state‑building 
endeavours by foreign countries are not a novel 
phenomenon. This article establishes an analogy 
between the present‑day US State‑building experience 
in Iraq and the reconstruction effort of the postbellum 
South in the 19th century. The aim is to try to identify 
similarities and differences in the dynamics involved 
in both instances. The assessment demonstrates that 
both reconstruction projects did not look to restore 
the previously existing political order. Quite on the 
contrary, the secular State‑building experiments of 
the US have culminated in the institutionalization 
of an agenda of radical transformation of the existing 
political, social and economic orders. Both Radical 
Reconstruction and the War in Iraq can be best 
understood in the framework of the contemporary 
peacebuilding project, encompassed within the liberal 
state‑building enterprise.
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Radical Reconstructions: a Critical Analogy of US Post‑conflict State‑building
Introduction
The Civil War was America’s first experiment in ideological 
conquest, therefore, and what followed was America’s first 
experiment	in	“nation‑building”.
(Robert	Kagan,	2006)
The	 foregoing	 statement	 by	 Robert	 Kagan	 (2006)	 in	 his	 revisionist	 book	
Dangerous Nation: America's Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of 
the Twentieth Century	 is	 at	 the	heart	 of	 our	present	 essay.	 From	having	been	 a	
shunned	 topic	 in	 most	 mainstream	 academic	 discussions	 for	 many	 years,	 the	
reconstruction	of	the	postbellum	South	has	become	a	subject	of	renewed	interest	
(Foner,	1997).	Various	scholars	have	revisited	this	complex	period	of	American	
history,	 reviewing	 and	 reanalyzing	 initial	 propositions.	 A	 short	 and	 heuristic	
appraisal	of	the	recent	literature	allows	for	some	consideration	on	the	analogous	
qualities	 of	 the	 postbellum	 reconstruction	 policies	 in	 the	 South	 and	 the	 recent	
American	 undertakings	 in	 post‑conflict	 State‑building	 in	 places	 so	 far	 off	 as	
iraq,	 for	example.
The	use	of	historical	analogies	in	international	relations	has	been	widely	discussed	
(Jervis,	 1976;	Khong,	 1992;	Vertzberger,	 2002).	While	 adverting	 to	 the	 dangers	 of	
historical	generalizations,	Robert	 Jervis	 (1976:	217)	 insists	“we	cannot	make	sense	
out	 of	 our	 environment	 without	 assuming	 that,	 in	 some	 sense,	 the	 future	 will	
resemble	the	past”.	According	to	Yuen	Foong	Khong	(1992:	7),	a	historical	analogy	
assumes	 that	 if	 two	or	more	events	“separated	 in	 time	agree	 in	one	 respect,	 than	
they	also	may	agree	in	another”.	in	this	sense,	analogies	are	useful	in	highlighting	
patterns	 of	 continuity	 and	 change	 in	 political	 behaviour.	 despite	 the	 dangers	 of	
historical	analogies,	we	cannot,	however,	fail	to	explore	the	similarities	of	the	two	
distinct	eras	referred	to	above	in	order	to	try	to	understand	some	of	the	dynamics	
and patterns in US post‑conflict interventions. What two other examples – i.e., the 
(possibly) first and the most recent US nation‑building endeavours – can assess 
the	 eventual	 existence	 of	 patterns	 of	 political	 though	 and	 behaviour	 throughout	
the	history	of	US	intervention?
In fact, it is difficult not to hear Kagan’s prose and relate it to today’s international 
milieu:
To	the	north,	the	defeated	South	was,	in	the	argot	of	the	twentieth	century,	an	
underdeveloped nation. Its underdevelopment, its backwardness, exemplified 
by	 the	 archaic	 institution	 of	 slavery,	 many	 northerners	 believed,	 had	 been	
responsible for the horrendous conflict that almost destroyed the entire nation. 
Nação e Defesa	 194
Luís	da	Vinha
now	the	north,	having	subdued	the	rebellion	and	punished	its	leaders,	had	the	
task	not	only	of	 standing	 the	conquered	 land	back	on	 its	 feet,	but	of	curing	 it	
of	 the	evils	 that	had	 led	 to	war,	which	 in	 turn	meant	dragging	 it	 forcibly	 into	
the	modern	world.	(Kagan,	2006:	270)
Kagan’s	 words	 parallel	 Thomas	 Barnett’s	 present‑day	 plea	 for	 the	 global	
dissemination	of	a	Western	model	of	political	and	economic	development,	particularly	
in	its	iraqi	setting:
if	America	can	enable	iraq’s	reconnection	to	the	world,	then	we	will	have	won	
a	real	victory	in	the	globalization	struggle,	and	the	transformation	of	the	Middle	
east	will	begin	 in	earnest.	Winning	the	war	brought	no	security	to	 the	United	
States.	 in	 fact,	by	 committing	ourselves	 to	 iraq’s	 eventual	 integration	 into	 the	
core,	we	temporarily	reduced	our	security.	But	winning	the	war	was	the	necessary	
first step to winning the peace we wage now, and that follow‑on victory will 
increase	US	security	in	the	long	run	quite	dramatically.	By	that	i	do	not	simply	
mean	 regime	 change	 in	 other	 countries	 seeking	WMd	or	 supporting	 terrorist	
networks,	 i	mean	 really	“draining	 the	 swamp”	of	all	 the	hatreds	 that	 fuel	 the	
violence	we	 suffered	on	 9/11.	 i	mean	destroying	disconnectedness	 across	 the	
region	as	a	whole.	(Barnett,	2004:	286)
Both	 statements	 demonstrate	 a	 historical	 commitment	 of	 US	 political	 and	
military	involvement	aimed	at	promoting	a	particular	political	agenda.	in	fact,	the	
US	has	a	long	track	record	of	foreign	interventions	and	State‑building	experiences	
(dobbins	 et al, 2008; 2007; 2003). Despite some policy adjustments, US officials 
have demonstrated some difficulty in learning from past experiences. Most of 
the	 correlations	 established	 with	 past	 American	 State‑building	 experiences	 tend	
to focus specifically on the post‑war reconstruction of Germany and Japan. These 
endeavours	are	usually	referred	to	with	great	enthusiasm	and	are	considered	“the	
gold	standard	for	postwar	reconstruction”	(dobbins	et al,	2008:	xiii).	Most	studies	
of	 US	 State‑building	 ventures	 have	 concentrated	 essentially	 on	 post‑cold	 War	
peace‑building	operations.1
Our	undertaking	in	the	present	essay	looks	to	go	further	back	in	history	to	try	
to comprehend the dynamics of US policy in post‑conflict environments. We believe 
that	what	has	been	at	stake	since	the	post‑civil	War	Reconstruction	is	a	project	of	
	 1	 For	some	other	historical	analogies	of	US	nation‑building	experiences	see	Gardner	and	Young	
(2005)	and	Sicherman	(2007).
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striking	political	 transformation.	As	david	 ignatius	 (2005)	put	 it	 “The	civil	War,	
like	 the	 invasion	of	 iraq,	was	a	war	of	 transformation	 in	which	the	victors	hoped	
to	reshape	the	political	culture	of	the	vanquished”.
State‑building,	Nation‑building,	and	Peace‑building
Before	we	can	embark	on	an	evaluation	spree	between	 the	 two	periods	under	
examination, it is important that we first consider what State‑building means. Like 
most	words	that	insinuate	themselves	into	conventional	speech	and	communication	
and become loosely defined, State‑building lacks a clear and definite description and 
explanation.	it	thus	shares	a	place	with	similar	concepts	in	the	lexical	quagmire	of	
the social sciences in general and the field of International Relations in particular. It 
is	nevertheless	possible	to	identify	some	features	that	are	recurrent	in	the	thematic	
literature	written	on	the	subject	of	State‑building.
At	the	outset	it	is	opportune	to	dispel	some	confusion	in	relation	to	the	ambiguity	
of	the	concepts	of	State‑building	and	nation‑building.	even	though	there	 is	some	
distinction	 applied	 to	 both	 concepts	 in	 many	 european	 schools	 of	 thought,	 we	
use	 the	 terms	 interchangeably.	The	Organization	 for	economic	co‑operation	 and	
development	(Oecd)	(2008:	1)	distinguishes	between	both	concepts,	underlining	
the	fact	that	“state	building	is	not	nation‑building”.	For	the	Oecd,	nation‑building	
implies	deliberate	strategies,	usually	applied	by	domestic	elites	to	create	a	common	
national	identity	around	the	idea	of	the	nation,	namely:
Actions	 undertaken,	 usually	 by	 national	 actors,	 to	 forge	 a	 sense	 of	 common	
nationhood,	 usually	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	 ethnic,	 sectarian	 or	 communal	
differences;	 usually	 to	 counter	 alternate	 sources	 of	 identity	 and	 loyalty;	 and	
usually	 to	mobilise	a	population	behind	a	parallel	 state‑building	project.	May	
or may not contribute to peacebuilding. Confusingly equated with post‑conflict 
stabilisation	 and	 peacebuilding	 in	 some	 recent	 scholarship	 and	 US	 political	
discourse.	(Oecd,	2008:	1)
despite	this	conceptual	distinction,	in	the	dominant	American	schools	of	thought	
both	 terms	 intermingle	 casually.	 in	 fact,	 Francis	 Fukuyama	 (2004b)	 in	 his	 article	
Nation‑Building 101 clarifies that when applying the expression Nation‑building “What 
we	 are	 really	 talking	 about	 is	 state‑building	—	 that	 is,	 creating	 or	 strengthening	
such	 government	 institutions	 as	 armies,	 police	 forces,	 judiciaries,	 central	 banks,	
tax‑collection	agencies,	health	and	education	systems,	and	the	like”.
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To	add	to	the	confusion,	while	defining	nation‑building,2	dobbins	et al	(2008:	
2)	 argue	 that	 “other	 terms	 currently	 in	 use	 to	 describe	 this	 process	 include	
stabilization and reconstruction, peace‑building, and statebuilding”.	Other	sources	could	
be	presented	to	justify	our	claim,	but	it	appears	to	suffice	to	assume	that	the	external	
factor	 imposing	new	institutional	structures	is	the	common	denominator	in	our	
essay,	 thus	 allowing	 us	 to	 use	 both	 terms	 (State‑building	 and	nation‑building)	
interchangeably.
State‑building	came	into	the	limelight	a	few	years	after	the	end	of	the	cold	War.	
With the lack of a credible inter‑state dispute between global powers to influence 
international	 politics,	 growing	 concern	 mounted	 with	 regard	 to	 other	 menaces.	
The	newly	designated	“weak”	or	“failed	states”	captured	the	political	imagination	
of	the	international	community,	especially	in	the	Western	states.	The	perils	facing	
international	 society	were	 diverse,	 but	 their	 root‑causes	were	 unique.	According	
to	 Fukuyama	 (2004a:	 17),	 “Weak	or	 failed	 states	 are	 close	 to	 the	 root	 of	many	of	
the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking 
and	terrorism”.
in	addition	to	the	grave	humanitarian	disasters	in	these	weak	states,	other	factors	
reinforced	the	urgency	of	international	intervention:
For	 a	 while,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 other	 countries	 could	 pretend	 that	 these	
problems	were	 just	local,	but	the	terrorist	attacks	of	September	11	proved	that	
state	weakness	constituted	a	huge	strategic	challenge	as	well.	Radical	 islamist	
terrorism	combined	with	the	availability	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction	added	a	
major	security	dimension	to	the	burden	of	problems	created	by	weak	governance.	
(…)	Suddenly	 the	ability	 to	shore	up	or	create	 from	whole	cloth	missing	state	
capabilities	and	institutions	has	risen	to	the	top	of	the	global	agenda	and	seems	
likely	to	be	a	major	condition	for	the	possibility	of	security	 in	 important	parts	
of	the	world.	Thus	state	weakness	is	both	a	national	and	an	international	issue	
today of the first order. (Fukuyama, 2004a:	18)
Humanitarian	issues	may	have	preceded	many	of	the	international	community’s	
(ic)	numerous	 concerns	 in	 relation	 to	 fragile	or	 failed	 states	 in	 the	1990s.	But,	 as	
previously	 alleged,	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 of	 9/11	 brought	 security	 matters	 to	 the	
 2 For James Dobbins et al (2008: 2) “Nation‑building can be defined as the use of armed forces 
in the aftermath of a conflict to promote an enduring peace and a transition to democracy”.
 3 The external dimension inherent in our understanding of State‑building is reflected in Mark 
Berger’s (2006: 6) definition that stresses “an externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form 
or	consolidate	a	stable,	and	sometimes	democratic,	government”.
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forefront	in	international	policy.	The	succession	of	international	military	interventions	
in the 1990s seemed to have been defined by a humanitarian whim within the IC. 
differing	 from	 their	cold	War	 counterparts,	 the	more	 recent	 operations	 revealed	
some novel characteristics, specifically the involvement in the domestic affairs of the 
states	concerned,	 the	centrality	of	humanitarian	concerns,	and	 the	use	of	military	
force	when	necessary	to	complete	the	ics	goals4	(cottney,	2008:	429).
These interventions diverged significantly from traditional peacekeeping 
operations.	consequently,	many	people	questioned	the	international	community’s	
legitimacy	to	intervene	in	the	internal	affairs	of	sovereign	states.	The	Un	embraced	
the	 international	commission	on	 intervention	 and	State	 Sovereignty’s	 concept	 of	
“Responsibility	 to	 Protect”	 (R2P)	 as	 response	 to	 this	 problem.5	Accordingly,	 R2P	
establishes	that:
Where	 a	 population	 is	 suffering	 serious	 harm,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 internal	 war,	
insurgency,	 repression	 or	 state	 failure,	 and	 the	 state	 in	 question	 is	 unwilling	
or	 unable	 to	 halt	 or	 avert	 it,	 the	 principle	 of	 non‑intervention	 yields	 to	 the	
international	responsibility	to	protect.	(international	commission	on	intervention	
and	State	Sovereignty,	2001:	xi)
But,	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 and	 early	 2000s	 there	 was	 a	 macro‑level	 shift	 in	 the	
international	 peacebuilding	 strategy	 which	 began	 to	 emphasize	 the	 construction	
and/or	 strengthening	 of	 legitimate	 governmental	 institutions	 in	 states	 emerging	
from internal conflict (Paris and Sisk, 2008). It is in this operational context that 
State‑building	 has	 acquired	 its	 recently	 renowned	 status,	 for	 “State‑building	 is	 a	
particular	approach	to	peacebuilding”	(Paris	and	Sisk,	2008:	1).	While	peace‑building	
“refers	to	efforts	to	create	conditions	in	which	violence	will	not	recur”,	State‑building	
distinguishes	 itself	 by	 being	 a	 “sub‑component	 of	 peacebuilding”,	 intended	 to	
strengthen	or	construct	legitimate	governmental	institutions	in	countries	emerging	
from conflicts6	(Idem:	14).
According to the OECD (2008: 14), State‑building can be defined “as purposeful 
action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an 
effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal 
	 4	 For	a	comprehensive	typology	of	the	different	peace	operations	since	the	cold	War	see	Andrew	
cottney	(2008).
 5 The UN and its Secretary‑general, Kofi Annan, adopted many of the premises of R2P in official 
documents	and	speeches.	See	cottney,	2008:	45.
	 6	 it	 is	possible	 to	 envision	State‑building	 in	 a	peaceful	 setting,	 but	 accounts	of	 state	 formation	
without	some	form	of	violence	at	some	stage	are	infrequent	(Oecd,	2008:	1).
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groups”.	 This	 particular	 description	 emphasises	 factors	 of	 legitimacy,	 domestic	
actions,	the	state‑society	negotiation	process,	along	with	the	appreciation	of	other	
informal	institutions	beside	the	state	(Idem:	Ibidem).
Most definitions of State‑building are more condensed. For Fukuyama:
At	the	core	of	state‑building	is	the	creation	of	a	government	that	has	a	monopoly	
of	legitimate	power	and	that	is	capable	of	enforcing	rules	throughout	the	state’s	
territory.	That	is	why	state‑building	always	begins	with	the	creation	of	military	
and	police	forces	or	the	conversion	of	the	former	regime’s	coercive	agencies	into	
new	ones.	(Fukuyama:	2005:87)
This	description	is	distinct	from	others	that	tend	to	emphasize	the	importance	
of	 political	 and	 economic	 factors,	 because	 “before	 you	 can	 have	 democracy	 or	
economic	development,	you	have	to	have	a	state”	(Idem:	84).
Another	view	is	that	of	dobbins	(2008:	72),	for	which	the	“prime	objective	of	any	
nation‑building	operation	is	to	make	violent	societies	peaceful,	not	to	make	poor	ones	
prosperous,	or	authoritarian	ones	democratic”.	dobbins	recognizes	that	economic	
development	and	political	reform	are	essential	to	this	transformation	but,	however,	
not sufficient by themselves. Therefore, public security and humanitarian assistance 
are the first‑order priorities for State‑building interventions, given that “If the most 
basic	human	needs	for	safety,	food	and	shelter	are	not	being	met,	any	money	spent	
on	political	or	economic	development	is	likely	to	be	wasted”	(Idem:	7).
in	operational	terms,	dobbins	(2007:	14‑15)	organizes	such	interventions	around	
a	sequential	hierarchy	of	tasks:
•	security:	 peacekeeping,	 law	 enforcement,	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	 security	 sector	
reform;
•	humanitarian	 relief:	 return	of	 refugees	and	response	 to	potential	epidemics,	
hunger,	and	lack	of	shelter;
•	governance:	resuming	public	services	and	restoring	public	administration;
•	economic	 stabilization:	 establishing	 a	 stable	 currency	 and	providing	 a	 legal	
and	 regulatory	 framework	 in	 which	 local	 and	 international	 commerce	 can	
resume;
•	democratization:	building	political	parties,	freedom	of	the	press,	civil	society,	
and	a	legal	and	constitutional	framework	for	elections;
•	development:	fostering	economic	growth,	poverty	reduction,	and	infrastructure	
improvements.
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in	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 technocratic	 conception,	 Lakhdar	 Brahimi	 (2007:	 4)	
describes	State‑building	“as	the	central	objective	of	any	peace	operation”.	According	
to	 the	 former	diplomat,	 State‑building	 is	 a	more	 appropriate	description	of	what	
the International Community is trying to accomplish in post‑conflict countries 
through	the	building	of	effective	systems	and	institutions	of	government.7	in	spite	of	
supporting	a	“light	footprint”	solution,	Brahimi	does	present	some	activities	that	need	
to undertaken, specifically constitution‑drafting, electoral processes, reintegration 
and	national	reconciliation,	and	the	implementation	of	the	rule	of	law.
Hence,	 as	 acknowledged	 before,	 State‑building	 is	 about	 transforming	 states,	
not	 restoring	 them	as	 they	were	 (Brahimi,	2007:	5).	Following	an	appraisal	of	 the	
preceding definitions, we cannot deny that post‑conflict State‑building reflects “a 
vision	 of	 social	 progress	 –	 commonly	 called	 the	 liberal	 peace	 –	 where	 post‑war	
reconstruction	is	wrapped	in	a	broader	concept	of	development	and	modernization”	
(Suhrke,	2007:	1292).	More	precisely,	“the	underlying	model	of	reconstruction	and	
modernization	is	derived	from	Western	experiences	of	liberal	political	development	
and	economic	growth”	(Suhrke,	2007:	1292).
despite	 recent	 criticism	 of	 the	 Liberal	 Peace	 model,	 Fukuyama	 (2004a:	 20)	
admits	 “in	 retrospect,	 there	was	 nothing	wrong	with	 the	Washington	consensus	
per	 se”8.	 Rather,	 “the	 problem	 lay	 in	 basic	 conceptual	 failures	 to	 unpack	 the	
	 7	 The	 concept	 of	 “institution”	 is	 also	problematic	 and	most	 studies	 on	 State‑building	 lack	 any	
kind	of	conceptual	framework.	Our	understanding	of	institutions	is	based	on	Marina	Ottaway’s	
essay	“Rebuilding	State	institutions	in	collapsed	States”	in	which	she	departs	from	a	dictionary	
definition of Institution (as “significant practice or organization in a society” or as “an established	
organization,	 especially	 of	 public	 character”)	 emphasizing	 the	 significant	 and	 established	
dimensions.	in	her	view,	the	international	community	understands	institution	(re)building	as	
organizing government departments and public agencies to fulfil their functions both efficiently 
and	democratically	following	models	of	Weberian	states	–	e.g.	electoral	institutions;	executive	
agencies (particularly dealing with finances); the parliament; the judiciary; the military; and the 
police.	Accordingly,	“what	external	agents	do	 is	set	up	organizations,	not	 institutions”	 (200:	
248).	These	organizations	will	only	become	significant	and	established	when	the	relevant	actors	
believe	they	provide	solutions	to	real	problems,	meaning	they	will	only	develop	into	institutions	
over	time	and	through	the	resolution	of	problems	affecting	the	local	community.
	 8	 “Washington	 consensus”	 refers	 to	 the	 term	 initially	 coined	 in	 1989	 by	 John	Williamson	 to	
describe a set of ten specific economic policy prescriptions that he considered should constitute 
the	"standard"	reform	package	promoted	for	crisis‑wracked	developing	countries	by	Washington,	
dc‑based	institutions	such	as	the	international	Monetary	Fund	(iMF),	World	Bank	and	the	US	
Treasury	department	and	comprehend:	1)	Fiscal	discipline;	2)	a	redirection	of	public	expenditure	
priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve 
income	 distribution,	 such	 as	 primary	 health	 care,	 primary	 education,	 and	 infrastructure;	
)	tax	reform	(to	lower	marginal	rates	and	broaden	the	tax	base);	4)	interest	rate	liberalization;	
5) a competitive exchange rate; 6) trade liberalization; 7) liberalization of inflows of foreign 
direct	 investment;	8)	privatization;	9)	deregulation	(to	abolish	barriers	 to	entry	and	exit);	and	
10)	secure	property	rights.
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different	dimensions	of	stateness,	and	to	understand	how	they	relate	to	economic	
development”	 (Idem:	 20‑21).	 in	order	 to	 solve	 this	predicament,	 Fukayama	 (Idem)	
recommends	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 scope	 (the	 different	 functions	 and	 goals	
taken	 on	 by	Governments)	 and	 strength	 (the	 ability	 of	 states	 to	 plan	 and	 execute	
policies,	and	to	enforce	laws	cleanly	and	transparently	—	what	is	now	commonly	
referred	to	as	state	or	institutional	capacity)	of	state	activity.
The	 claim	 that	 institutions	 (the	 strength	 dimension)	 are	 the	 critical	 variable	 in	
development	 has	 become	 conventional	wisdom.	 The	 disappointment	 of	many	 of	
the peacebuilding operations of the 1990s revealed the inadequacies of quick‑fix 
solutions,	such	as	rapid	elections	and	disengaged	schemes	of	economic	privatization.	
As	Paris	and	Sisk	argue:
The	 international	community’s	 efforts	 to	 promote	 stability	 in	war‑torn	 states	
by	encouraging	democratization	and	marketization	in	the	1990s	had	created	not	
a	 liberal	peace	but	 instead	 renewed	 competition	 and	violence	 in	part	 because	
peacebuilders had not made sufficient efforts to build basic institutional structures 
(including,	most	importantly,	rule	of	law	institutions)	that	both	democracy	and	
market	economics	required	to	function	well.	(2008:	10)
Subsequently,	the	international	community’s	answer	to	the	contemporary	weak	
state	 challenge	 seems	 to	 be	 strengthening	 the	 State‑building	 effort,	 by	 working	
to	overcome	 its	 intrinsic	 tensions	 and	 contradictions.	A	departure	 from	 this	 tract	
“would	 be	 tantamount	 to	 abandoning	 tens	 of	 millions	 of	 people	 to	 lawlessness,	
predation,	disease,	and	fear”	(Idem:	14).
Reconstructing	the	Postbellum	South	
despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	more	 recent	 studies	 on	postbellum	 history	 and	policy	
are	much	more	sensitive	to	the	complexities	involved	in	the	reconstruction	process,	
it	is	still	common	to	come	across	opinions	similar	to	those	of	writer	and	diplomat	
claude	Bowers:
never	have	American	public	men	in	responsible	positions,	directing	the	destiny	
of	 the	nation,	been	so	brutal,	hypocritical,	 and	corrupt.	The	constitution	was	
treated as a door‑mat on which politicians and army officers wiped their feet 
after	wading	in	the	muck.	(…)	Brutal	men,	inspired	by	personal	ambition	or	party	
motives,	assumed	the	pose	of	philanthropists	and	patriots,	and	thus	deceived	and	
misguided	vast	numbers	of	well‑meaning	people	in	the	north.	(1929:	v‑vi)
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Oddly	 enough,	 Bowers’	 words	 echo	 many	 contemporary	 lamentations	 of	
America’s	 latest	 State‑building	 enterprise.	 However,	 it	 is	 only	 fair	 to	 glance	 on	
Southern	 reconstruction	 through	 the	 latest	 academic	 perspectives	 in	 order	 to	 try	
to	comprehend	how	the	various	challenges	encountered	were	dealt	with.	Until	the	
1950s	most	of	the	texts	on	Reconstruction	had	been	about	sordid	motives	and	human	
depravity.9	Revisionist	 literature	 initiated	in	the	1960s	has	tended	to	expose	some	
commendable	achievements	of	Reconstruction,	recognizing	some	aspects	of	social	
and	political	progress	(Foner,	1997).	nevertheless,	the	legacy	of	the	civil	War	was	
a	tragic	death	toll	and	a	massive	devastation	of	American	society.	After	over	four	
years of belligerence there finally came a time “to bind up the nation’s wounds”10.	
The	South	was	particularly	devastated	by	the	years	of	belligerence.	But	despite	the	
misery	and	destruction,	the	South’s	reconstruction	“involved	more	than	rebuilding	
shattered	farms	and	repairing	broken	bridges”,	for	“an	entire	social	order	had	been	
swept	away,	and	on	its	ruin	a	new	one	had	to	be	constructed”	(Foner,	1989:	128).	
The	preparation	for	Reconstruction	was	being	pondered,	at	 least	 theoretically,	
from	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 War.	 For	 Abraham	 Lincoln	 the	 quintessential	 purpose	 of	
Reconstruction	was	restoring	the	old	relationship	between	Southern	States	and	the	
Union.	 in	fact,	President	Lincoln	did	not	envision	any	sweeping	social	revolution	
or	 “believe	 that	 Reconstruction	 entailed	 social	 and	 political	 changes	 beyond	 the	
abolition	of	slavery”	(Foner,	1989:	6)	naturally	he	considered	this	a	Presidential,	not	
a	congressional,	duty.11	congress,	for	its	part,	believed	this	to	be	its	responsibility.	
A	dilemma	shortly	ensued	however	because	both	the	President	and	the	congress	
were both championing conflicting plans for Reconstruction (Stammp, 1970: 28).
Lincoln	did	not	hesitate	to	act	and,	as	soon	as	a	considerable	area	of	the	South	
was	under	Federal	occupation,	he	began	devising	and	implementing	a	program	of	his	
own.	Abraham	Lincoln’s	Reconstruction	program	looked	to	facilitate	the	reintegration	
of	 the	Southern	states	by	recognizing	state	governments	composed	by	a	minority	
of	voters	who	would	 take	an	oath	of	allegiance	 to	 the	Union	 (Foner,	1989:	6).	 in	
opposition,	congress	adopted	the	Wade‑davis	Bill	in	July	1864,	outlining	a	harsher	
	 9	 For	an	understanding	of	the	traditional	version	of	Reconstruction	see	Kenneth	Stammp	(1970:	
7‑8).
10	 Quote	from	Abraham	Lincoln’s	Second	inaugural	Address.	Available	at	http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25819.
11	 For	 Abraham	 Lincoln,	 as	 commander	 in	 chief	 of	 the	 armed	 forces,	 it	 was	 the	 Presidents	
constitutional	 obligation	 to	 grant	 individual	 pardons	 or	 a	 general	 amnesty	 to	 Southerners.	
consequently,	 it	was	his	 responsibility	 to	 impose	 the	 conditions	of	 amnesty,	 to	decide	when	
loyal governments had been re‑established in the South, and fix the temporal horizon of martial 
law.
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program	 for	 Southern	 states,	 i.e.	 establishing	 a	military	 governor	 to	 temporarily	
rule	each	confederate	state	and	requiring	Southerners	to	take	an	“iron‑clad	oath”	
in	order	 to	be	able	 to	partake	politically.	The	President	vetoed	 the	bill,	 clarifying	
he was reluctant to “be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration” 
(Lincoln	Apud	Stammp,	1970:	40).	Lincoln	followed	his	arrangement	until	his	death,	
recognizing	several	Southern	state	governments	composed	by	local	minorities.
With	 regard	 to	 slavery	 and	 the	 race	 problem,	 Abraham	 Lincoln	 approached	
Reconstruction	 with	 three	 basic	 assumptions:	 “1)	 emancipation	 from	 slavery	
should	be	gradual;	2)	colonization	was	the	ideal	solution	to	the	race	problem;	and	
)	 colonization	 failing,	 the	 free	negro	would	 have	 to	 accept	 an	 inferior	 status	 in	
American	society”	(Stammp,	1970:	5).
President	Lincoln’s	death	in	April	1865	set	the	stage	for	some	Radical	Republicans	
to	 redirect	 the	 Reconstruction12.	 These	men	were,	 according	 to	 Kenneth	 Stammp	
(1970:	50)	“determined	not	to	lose	the	fruits	of	war	through	a	soft	peace”,	meaning	a	
reconciliation	that	“would	enable	the	southern	rebel	leaders	to	regain	the	positions	
of	political	and	economic	power	they	had	held	before	the	war”.
The	 presidential	 ascent	 of	 Andrew	 Johnson	 was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 harsher	
rhetoric	 regarding	 Reconstruction.	 Straight	 away	 he	 asserted	 the	 need	 to	 bring	
key	 confederates	 to	 trial,	 break	 the	 large	 southern	 estates,	 and	 abolish	 slavery	
completely.	The	Radical	Republicans	in	congress1	quickly	rallied	around	Johnson	
and his sweeping agenda. However, as time would confirm, President Johnson and 
the	Radicals	had	 in	 fact	very	 little	 in	 common14.	Above	all,	Andrew	 Johnson	was	
not	elated	in	replacing	the	Southern	landed	aristocracy	with	a	northern	moneyed	
aristocracy.15	Hastily,	President	Johnson	took‑up	Abraham	Lincolns	plan,	attempting	
to	make	Reconstruction	a	presidential	endeavour	of	swift	accomplishment16.	After	
12	 Andrew	Johnson	referred	to	the	policy	as	“Restoration”.
1 The Thirty‑ninth Congress was initially defines around four political groups – i.e. Democratic 
minority,	 conservative	 Republicans,	 radical	 Republicans,	 and	 moderate	 Republicans.	 While	
initially	holding	the	balance	of	power,	the	moderate	Republicans	soon	allied	themselves	with	
the	Radicals	giving	them	control	of	congress	by	the	summer	of	1866.
14	 The	common	issues	for	both	Andrew	Johnson	and	the	Radical	Republicans	were	their	mutual	
desire	 to	 preserve	 the	 Union	 by	 suppressing	 the	 Southern	 revolt,	 uphold	 the	 Thirteenth	
Amendment,	and	their	desire	to	destroy	southern	planter	aristocracy.	Beyond	these	basic	issues	
the	Radicals	had	a	much	more	drastic	plan	for	southern	reconstruction,	entailing	much	broader	
changes	in	the	South.	See	Kenneth	Stammp	(1970:	5‑54).
15	 Keeping	with	his	modest	roots,	Andrew	Johnson	wanted	a	reconstruction	project	which	would	
empower	the	yeoman	class	in	the	South.
16	 Andrew	 Johnson	 did	 alter	 some	 of	 the	 terms	 of	Abraham	Lincoln’s	 plan,	 namely	 restricting	
the benefits of amnesty of Confederate civil and military officers and appointing provisional 
governments	 in	 the	southern	states	until	an	electoral	delegation	could	be	assembled.	He	also	
demanded	that	confederate	states	declare	the	illegality	of	their	ordinance	of	secession,	repudiate	
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having verified the transition of political power to the newly elected governors and 
legislatures	during	the	summer,	Johnson	announced	the	reconstruction	process	was	
completed when Congress finally assembled in December of 1865.17
Congress rejected the President’s policy, rebuffing the new governments in the 
South	 and	 devising	 a	 new	 plan	 for	 reconstruction.	 contrary	 to	Andrew	 Johnson	
who	contended	the	confederate	states	had	never	been	out	of	the	Union,	the	Radical	
Republicans	considered	the	Southern	states	had	in	fact	seceded	from	the	Union	and	
should	be	treated	as	conquered	provinces	and	be	“subject	to	all	the	liabilities	of	a	
vanquished	foe”	(Stammp,	1970:	86).	consequently,	only	congress	had	the	power	
to	admit	and	rebuild	the	Southern	states.	The	implications	of	such	an	outlook	were	
that,	 according	 to	George	W.	 Julian,	 the	 secessionist	 states	would	 be	 treated	 “as	
outside	of	their	constitutional	relations	to	the	Union,	and	as	incapable	of	restoring	
themselves	 to	 it	 except	 on	 conditions	 to	 be	prescribed	by	congress”	 (Julien	 apud	
Stammp,	1970:	87).18
The	 Republican	 victory	 in	 the	 1866	 congressional	 elections	 literally	 put	 the	
Radicals	 in	 charge	 of	 Reconstruction.	 The	 question	 of	 slavery	 was	 of	 critical	
importance	 to	 Radical	 Reconstruction.	 not	 only	 was	 there	 the	 conviction	 of	 the	
moral	 obligation	 to	 end	 slavery,	 but	 also	 the	 former	 slaves	political	 support	was	
vital	to	the	Radical’s	new	program.	Aiding	the	emancipation	of	former	slaves	was	
a	 central	 feature	 of	 Radical	 Reconstruction	 or	 as	 Stammp	 (1970:	 122)	 argues	 “to	
give	full	citizenship	to	southern	negroes	–	 in	effect,	 to	revolutionize	the	relations	
of	the	two	races	–	was	the	leap	in	the	dark	of	the	reconstruction	era”.	even	so,	for	
Radicals	no	 true	 liberation	 could	be	 accomplished	without	 economic	 assistance.19	
The confiscation of land and its redistribution to former slaves figured prominently 
on	the	Radical	Agenda.20	it	embodied	a	plan	to	“to	overrun	the	plantation	system	
all	confederate	debts,	as	well	as	ratify	the	Thirteenth	Amendment.	consequently,	the	process	
of	political	reconstruction	would	then	be	completed	and	martial	 law	could	be	revoked	by	the	
President	and	federal	troops	removed.
17	 no	real	political	change	was	brought	by	the	newly	elected	governments	since	the	majority	of	
elected	representatives	were	planters	and	confederate	leaders	and	pursued	policies	very	similar	
to	their	antebellum	counterparts.	especially	defeating	to	Andrew	Johnson	were	the	Black	codes	
promulgated	in	South,	which	denied	coloured	people	many	of	their	newly	acquired	rights	by	
limiting	many	of	their	activities.
18	 equally	 important	 to	 the	debate	was	 the	negro	question,	 for	which	Radicals	only	admitted	a	
truly	equal	status	for	whites	and	blacks	alike.
19	 The	over	 four	million	 former	 slaves	 emerged	 in	a	 condition	of	 complete	destitution,	without	
work,	land	or	legal	claim	to	any	belonging.	The	Radicals	believed	that	this	condition	of	economic	
helplessness	threatened	to	become	a	purely	nominal	freedom.
20 Many of the plans proposed established the distribution of confiscated land to every adult 
freedman,	 selling	 the	 rest	 to	 pay	 for	 public	 debt,	 provide	 pension	 for	 disabled	 veterans	 and	
compensate	loyal	men	for	property	damages	during	the	war.	
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and	 provide	 former	 slaves	 with	 homesteads”,	 ultimately	 reshaping	 Southern	
society	 (Foner,	 1989:	 25).	However,	 the	 land	 reform	programs	were	 defeated	 in	
congress,	 for	 the	moderate	Republicans	did	not	accept	such	sweeping	 initiatives.	
The land confiscation and redistribution proposal was a striking blow for Radicals 
and	“probably	made	inevitable	the	ultimate	failure	of	the	whole	radical	program”21	
(Stammp,	1970:	129).
Federal	assistance	on	a	less	ambitious	scale	was	accomplished	through	the	creation	
of	the	Bureau	of	Refugees,	Freedmen,	and	Abandoned	Lands	(commonly	known	as	
the	Freedmen’s	Bureau).22	The	Bureau	was	intended	to	last	for	only	one	year	after	
the	 war	 ended,	 but	 following	 the	 congressional	 committee	 on	 Reconstruction’s	
proposal, Congress extended the Freedmen’s Bureau indefinitely and increased 
its	powers	–	e.g.	supervision	of	labour	contracts	and	creation	of	special	courts	for	
black	people	when	 they	were	unable	 to	 get	 justice	 in	 other	 courts	 –	 contributing	
to	 “the	 transformation	 of	 the	 negro	 from	 slave	 to	 citizen”	 (Stammp,	 1970:	 1).	
However,	in	1869	congress	terminated	the	Freedmen’s	Bureau	and	vanquished	its	
most	valuable	agency	for	protecting	the	civil	and	political	rights	of	former	slaves.	
in	 fact,	 the	civil	Rights	Act2	 of	 1866	 and	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment24	were	 left	
without any formal Federal safeguards, allowing for the defiance of black people 
exercising	their	recently	acquired	political	rights.
in	contrast,	Reconstruction	policy	dealing	with	white	Southerners	was	surprisingly	
indulgent.	 it	 is	 commonly	 accepted	 that	confederates	 and	 their	 supporters	were	
castigated	 and	 penalized	 for	 their	 actions.	 Yet	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Southerners	
who	took	up	arms	or	backed	the	confederate	cause	were	usually	only	required	to	
21 One of the reasons identified by Kenneth Stammp (1970: 129) for not approving the land reform 
program	was	due	to	the	fact	that	many	moderate	and	radical	Republicans	did	not	understand	
the	need	of	giving	the	freedman	economic	emancipation.	Most	believed	that	it	would	be	enough	
to	 approve	 a	 series	 of	 constitutional	 amendments	 granting	 freedom,	 civil	 rights	 and	 voting	
capacity	to	former	slaves.	Also,	most	Republicans	were	averse	to	such	Federal	meddling	in	the	
economic	realm,	seeing	it	as	an	ignoble	attack	on	property	rights.
22	 The	Freedman’s	Bureau	provided	white	refugees	and	freedmen	with	food,	clothing	and	medical	
care, allowing them to settle on abandoned or confiscated land for a limited period of time, 
namely	the	transition	from	slavery	to	freedom.
2 The Civil Rights Act was the first important action by Congress towards protecting the rights 
of	 Freedmen	 during	 Reconstruction.	 Passed	 on	 March	 1866,	 as	 a	 counterattack	 against	 the	
Black	codes	in	the	southern	United	States,	it	guaranteed	the	rights	to	make	contracts,	sue,	bear	
witness	in	court	and	own	private	property.
24	 The	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 was	 adopted	 on	 July	 9,	 1868	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Reconstruction	
Amendments. The amendment provides a broad definition of citizenship, overruling Dred 
Scott v. Sandford	 (1857)	 which	 had	 excluded	 slaves,	 and	 their	 descendants,	 from	 possessing	
constitutional	rights.
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take	an	oath	of	allegiance	in	order	to	be	pardoned	and	regain	their	basic	political	
rights.	even	the	confederate	leaders	suffered	only	minor	sanctions.	The	sentences	
for	confederates	were	in	fact	quite	lenient:
With	few	exceptions,	even	the	property	of	confederate	leaders	was	untouched,	
save,	of	 course,	 for	 the	 emancipation	of	 their	 slaves.	 indeed,	 the	only	penalty	
imposed	 on	 most	 confederate	 leaders	 was	 a	 temporary	 political	 disability	
provided	in	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	But	in	1872	congress	pardoned	all	but	
a	 handful	 of	 Southerners;	 and	 soon	 former	confederate	 leaders	were	 serving	
as	 state	 governors,	 as	members	 of	congress,	 and	 even	 as	cabinet	 advisers	 of	
Presidents.	(Stammp,	1970:	10‑11)
But there were significant differences in the perspective underlying the Radical’s 
Reconstruction	 project.	As	 stated	 previously,	 Radicals	 looked	 upon	 the	 Southern	
states	as	secessionists	who	had	broken	their	connection	to	the	Union	and	forfeited	
their	 political	 privileges.	 Therefore,	 from	March	 1867	 onwards,	 several	 acts	were	
passed in order to impose Radical Reconstruction. The first act declared “no legal 
State	governments	or	adequate	protection	 for	 life	or	property	now	exists	 in	 rebel	
States”	(Stammp,	1970:	144).	As	a	result,	the	Andrew	Johnson	approved	governments	
were rejected and the ten unreconstructed Southern States were divided into five 
military	districts.25
Under the authority of the district commanders qualified voters were enrolled, 
state	constitutional	conventions	were	established,	state	legislators	were	elected,	new	
state constitutions were framed, and Constitutional Amendments were ratified.26	By	
1868	six	of	the	Sothern	states	had	completed	this	process	and	were	readmitted	into	
the	Union,	while	 the	other	 four	were	readmitted	 in	1870,	completing	 the	political	
Reconstruction	of	the	Southern	states.
The	Radical	governments	established	in	Southern	states	did	not	however	impose	
radical	reforms.	in	effect,	the	“delegates	showed	little	interest	in	experimentation”	
(Stammp,	 1970:	 170).	 The	 newly	 written	 constitutions	 were	 quite	 orthodox	 and	
there	was	no	penchant	 for	novel	 executive	or	 judicial	 systems.	even	 in	 the	 social	
25 Of the original 11 secessionist States only Tennessee was considered reconstructed. The five 
military	districts	were:	1)	South	carolina	and	north	carolina;	2)	Virginia;	)	Georgia,	Alabama	
and	Florida;	4)	Mississippi	and	Arkansas;	5)	Louisiana	and	Texas.
26	 The	 district	 commanders	 had	 powers	 “to	 protect	 all	 persons	 in	 their	 rights	 of	 person,	 to	
suppress	insurrection,	disorder	and	violence,	and	to	punish	…	all	disturbers	of	the	public	peace”,	
having the authority to remove civil officers, make arrests, try civilians in military courts, and 
use	federal	troops	to	preserve	order	(K.	Stammp,	1970:	145).
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and	economic	realms	few	radical	experiments	were	approved.	While	proclaiming	
equality	for	all	men	and	recognizing	freedmen’s	political	rights,	few	constitutions	
advanced	 any	 considerable	 innovation	 on	 the	 social	 relations	 between	 races,	
namely	segregation.	On	the	whole,	they	were	conservative	documents	that	simply	
accomplished	some	long	overdue	reforms.
Throughout this process the Radicals were also redefining the relationship of 
the	 legislative	 and	 executive	branches	by	 restricting	presidential	 powers.	 in	 1867	
several	Acts	were	passed	by	congress	allowing	for	greater	leeway	in	the	pursuit	of	
Radical	Reconstruction.	These	Acts	served	as	a	prelude	to	the	impeachment	process	
of	President	Johnson	in	early	1868.	And	although	the	Radicals	lost	this	prosecution,	
Johnson’s	political	élan	was	severely	wounded.
But	the	Radicals	could	not	rejoice	too	enthusiastically	for	Radical	Reconstruction	
was	being	undermined	in	the	South.	After	having	control	of	all	eleven	states	of	the	
former	confederacy	in	the	years	between	1867	and	1877,	white	democrats	gradually	
returned	 to	 power.27	 driving	 the	 white	 redemption	 of	 the	 South	 were	 various	
accusations against Radical Reconstruction, specifically that the governments set 
up	by	the	Republicans	“expelled	from	power	the	South’s	experienced	statemen	and	
natural	leaders	and	replaced	them	with	untrained	men	who	were	almost	uniformly	
incompetent	and	corrupt”	 (Stammp,	1970:	 156).	To	be	precise	 the	main	 targets	of	
these	claims	were	the	carpetbaggers,28	scalawags29	and	former	slaves,	whom	were	
held	responsible	for	the	disastrous	economic	situation	and	the	ruining	of	the	whole	
class	of	white	property	holders	in	Southern	states.	despite	broad	condemnation,	most	
carpetbaggers	seemed	to	merge	the	aspiration	of	personal	gain	with	a	commitment	
in	participating	in	an	endeavour	“to	substitute	the	civilization	of	freedom	for	that	
of	slavery”	(Foner,	1989:	296).	But	The	Radical	Governments	in	the	South	did	in	fact	
contribute	to	 this	general	censure.	news	of	 fraudulent	bond	issues,	grafts	 in	 land	
sales	 and	purchases,	 deception	 in	 contracts	 for	public	works	 and	 squandering	of	
public	and	federal	funds	were	commonplace.	State	debts	soon	swelled,	burdening	
the	public	with	higher	tax	rates.	Stammp	(1970:	18)	insists	that	taxes,	government	
27 The first state to be “redeemed” was Tennessee in 1869. The redemption process was completed 
by	1877	with	the	democrats	rise	to	power	in	South	carolina,	Florida	and	Louisiana.
28	 carpetbagger	was	the	name	southerners	gave	to	northerners	who	moved	to	the	South	during	
the	Reconstruction	era,	and	formed	a	coalition	with	freedmen	and	scalawags	in	the	Republican	
Party	 to	 control	 former	confederate	 states.	 The	main	 accusation	 against	 them	was	 that	 they	
came	to	the	South	to	loot	and	plunder	merely	for	economic	and	political	greed.
29	 The	 term	 scallawags	 was	 used	 to	 characterize	 poor	 southern	 whites	 who	 supported	
Reconstruction	and	aided	carpetbaggers	and	freedmen	 in	governing	Southern	states	after	 the	
war.	They	were	accused	of	betraying	 their	 race	and	heritage	 for	 the	 spoils	and	opportunities	
offered	by	Reconstruction.	
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expenditure	 and	 public	 debts	 were	 bound	 to	 increase	 regardless	 of	 who	 was	
governing	in	the	South,	due	to	the	pressing	requirement	of	physical	reconstruction.	
Therefore,	the	need	for	railroad	systems,	public	services	and	school	systems	would	
have	burdened	any	government	in	charge.	nevertheless,	the	downfall	of	the	Radical	
Governments	in	the	South	halted	the	advancement	of	any	further	political	reforms	
and	 allowed	 for	 the	 return	 of	 a	more	 traditional	 political	 arrangement.	After	 the	
controversial	Presidential	elections	of	1876,0	Rutherford	Hayes	withdrew	the	 last	
federal	troops	from	the	South1	in	April	1877.	The	Republicans	gradual	division	and	
the	 retrenchment	 of	 its	 forward‑looking	 agenda	 throughout	 the	 Reconstructions	
years	were	foretelling.	 its	Radical	branch	was	overcome	by	the	times,	giving	way	
to	a	new	generation	of	stalwarts	who	sought	“not	reform,	but	the	status quo”	(Idem:	
190).	 in	conjunction	with	 the	weakening	of	 the	Republican	Party,	 racial	prejudice	
was	consolidating	in	the	South	and	north.	The	increasingly	intolerant	tone	of	the	
redeemed	South	was	reinforced	by	physical	violence.	The	ascension	of	organized	
terrorism2 was a form of fighting the Radicals and their policies and gaining control 
of	 local	 governments,	 namely	 by	 intimidating	 the	 participation	 of	 black	 voters.	
economic	coercion	was	also	used	effectively	to	triumph	over	the	Radicals.
in	the	end,	the	lack	of	firm	support	for	Radical	Reconstruction	was	its	undoing.	
in	 addition	 to	 questioning	 the	moral	 integrity	 of	 Radical	 Reconstruction,	many	
initial	 advocates	 and	 sponsors	 abandoned	 the	 project.	 northern	 businessmen	
complained	that	existing	conditions	in	the	South	discouraged	any	type	of	significant	
investment.	Freedmen	were	also	disenchanted	with	the	development	of	Radical	
policies,	even	though	they	recognized	the	pivotal	role	o	the	Republicans	in	their	
emancipation.	Furthermore,	northerners	 in	general	were	also	growing	weary	of	
Reconstruction.	The	years	of	economic	depression	beginning	in	187	aggravated	
the	situation:
As	they	became	concerned	about	business	stagnation,	unemployment,	collapsing	
farm	prices,	and	the	decay	of	public	and	private	morals,	northerners	not	only	
0 The 1867 Presidential elections was the first time a candidate who received the greater number 
of	 popular	 votes	 (Samuel	 Tilden)	 did	 not	 receive	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 votes	 in	 the	 electoral	
college.	President	Rutherford	Hayes	was	awarded	the	20	delegates	of	Florida,	Louisiana	and	
South	carolina	after	charges	of	fraud	and	threats	of	violence	were	made	against	the	democrats,	
allowing	him	to	win	by	185	to	184	votes.	
1	 The	last	states	to	have	the	federal	troops	removed	were	South	carolina,	Florida	and	Louisiana.	
2	 Some	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	 organizations	 were	 the	 Klu	 Klux	 Klan,	 Knights	 of	 the	 White	
camelia,	White	Brotherhood,	Pale	Faces	and	the	76	Association.	
	 According	 to	 Kenneth	 Stammp	 (1970:	 207),	 by	 1870	 the	 new	 York	Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle,	 The	 new	 York	 Tribune,	 and	 the	 Nation	 were	 all	 demanding	 the	 end	 of	 Radical	
Reconstruction	due	to	its	hampering	of	Southern	business	and	investment.
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lost	interest	in	reconstruction	but	temporarily	lost	faith	in	the	Republican	party.	
(Stammp,	1970:	209)
The	Republican	defeat	in	the	elections	for	the	House	of	Representatives	in	1874	
guaranteed	the	beginning	of	end	of	federal	protection	for	the	Southern	freedmen.	
The	withdrawal	of	 the	 last	 federal	 troops	from	the	South	 in	1877	 implied	the	end	
of	Radical	Reconstruction.	Ultimately,	the	end	of	the	Radicals	meant	also	“that	the	
idealism of the antislavery crusade finally died” (Idem:	211).
in	 this	 sense,	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 the	 political	 and	 social	 progress	 black	 people	
experienced	 after	 the	 war	 was	 less	 a	 result	 of	 Radical	 Reconstruction	 than	 of	
self‑organization	and	mobilization.	The	former	slaves	organized	themselves	in	the	
South	around	existing	and	newly	created	institutions:
Blacks	withdrew	 almost	 entirely	 form	white‑controlled	 churches,	 establishing	
independent	religious	institutions	of	their	own;	and	a	diverse	panoply	of	fraternal,	
benevolent,	 and	mutual	 aid	 societies	 also	 sprang	 into	 existence.	 And	 though	
aided	by	northern	 reform	societies	 and	 the	 federal	government,	 the	 freedmen	
often	 took	 the	 initiative	 in	establishing	schools.	nor	was	black	suffrage	 thrust	
upon	 an	 indifferent	 black	population,	 for	 in	 1865	 and	 1866	black	 conventions	
gathered	throughout	the	South	to	demand	civil	equality	and	the	right	to	vote.	
(Foner,	1997:	99)
A final assessment of the Reconstruction of the postbellum	 South	 is	 not	
straightforward.	Progress	was	made	in	many	segments	of	political	and	social	life	and	
the	Southern	States	were	soundly	reintegrated	into	the	Union.	However,	traditional	
as well revisionist accounts of Reconstruction have been all but flattering. It has 
developed	into	a	general	consensus	that	“whether	measured	by	the	dreams	inspired	
by	 emancipation	 or	 the	more	 limited	 goals	 of	 securing	 blacks’	 rights	 as	 citizens	
and	free	laborers,	and	establishing	an	enduring	Republican	presence	in	the	South,	
Reconstruction	can	only	be	judged	as	a	failure”	(Foner,	1989:	60).
This	unenthusiastic	account	of	the	reconstruction	of	the	postbellum	South	resonates	
closely	with	contemporary	criticism	of	US	involvement	in	other	postwar	scenarios.	
The	 recent	 US	 State‑building	 endeavour	 in	 iraq	 has	 also	 been	 subject	 to	 a	 wide	
array	of	disparagement.	We	proceed	to	explore	 the	reconstruction	process	 in	iraq	
in	order	 to	 try	 to	discern	 the	existence	of	similar	patterns	and	dynamics	with	 the	
postbellum	experience.	
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Pottery	Barn	on	the	Tigris:	Breaking	and	rebuilding	Iraq
The	 rules	 of	 the	 game	were	 set	 from	 the	 go.	 Former	 Secretary	 of	 State,	colin	
Powell,	 warned	 that	 the	 war	 on	 iraq	 had	 to	 observe	 the	 so‑called	 Pottery	 Barn	
Rule	 –	 i.e.	 “if	 you	break	 it,	 you	own	 it”	 (Sicherman,	 2007:	 28).4	despite	Powell’s	
admonition,	and	contrary	to	the	dominant	perceptions	in	the	Administration,	the	US	
invasion	broke	the	already	fragile	iraqi	state.	The	overwhelming	US	military	force	
quickly	decapitated	 the	 regime,	but	also	 left	 a	heavy	 footprint	 in	 its	path.	Rather	
than	being	hailed	as	liberators,	the	US	forces	promptly	faced	a	power	vacuum	and	
recognized the difficulties ahead, namely the absence of an identifiable state structure 
capable	of	providing	for	the	iraqis.	Since	then,	a	great	deal	of	censorship	regarding	
the	US‑led	military	 involvement	 in	 iraq	has	 been	directed	 at	 the	principle	 of	 the	
intervention	itself.	it	is	not	our	intention	here	to	engage	in	this	debate.	We	simply	
accept	that	the	US	did	intervene	militarily	in	iraq,	toppling	its	political	regime,	and	
subsequently	undertaking	conventional	State‑building	efforts:
Once	the	Ba’athists	were	ousted	from	power,	the	vacuum	of	political	authority	
had somehow to be filled, and order on the streets had to be re‑established. 
The	 state	 as	 an	 institution	 had	 to	 be	 restructured	 and	 revived.	 Basic	 services	
had	to	be	restored,	infrastructure	repaired,	and	jobs	created.	Fighting	between	
disparate	 ethnic,	 regional,	 and	 religious	 groups	 –	 many	 of	 them	 with	 well	
armed	 militias	 –	 had	 to	 be	 prevented	 or	 preempted.	 The	 political	 culture	 of	
fear,	distrust,	brutal	dominance,	and	blind	submission	had	to	be	 transformed.	
Political	 parties	 and	 civil	 society	 organizations	 working	 to	 represent	 citizen	
interests,	 rebuild	communities,	and	educate	 for	democracy	had	 to	be	assisted,	
trained,	 and	 protected.	A	 plan	 needed	 to	 be	 developed	 to	 produce	 a	 broadly	
representative	and	legitimate	new	government,	and	to	write	a	new	constitution	
for	 the	 future	political	order.	And	sooner	or	 later,	democratic	elections	would	
need	to	be	held.	(diamond,	2005:	9‑10)	
diamond	 eloquently	 summarized	 the	 challenges	 facing	 the	 US,	 but	 the	
prescriptions	were	not	so	easily	achieved.	The	State‑building	debate	of	the	1990s	in	
the US had already reflected on the numerous shortcomings of past interventions 
and	put	 forth	 various	 recommendations	 for	 the	 future	 (clarke	 and	Herbst,	 1996;	
Hamre	and	Sullivan,	2002;	Ottaway,	2002;	Powell,	1992;	von	Hippel,	2000).	However,	
4	 According	 to	naomi	Klein	 (2005),	The	Pottery	Barn	 chain	 stores	do	not	 actually	have	 such	a	
rule,	but	the	expression	has	been	attributed	to	colin	Powell	by	author	Bob	Woodward.
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as events soon confirmed, the lessons of the past had not been incorporated into 
US	pre‑war	planning.
it	has	become	a	cliché	to	assert	that	the	US	and	its	coalition	partners	did	not	
prepare	for	postwar	iraq.	However,	there	were	an	assortment	of	plans	and	planning	
processes	developed	in	many	agencies	and	organizations	within	the	US	Government	
before	the	war	commenced	(Bensahel	et al,	2008;	Rathmell,	2005;	Sicherman,	2007).	
Although	we	can	dispute	their	aptness	and	efficacy	for	dealing	with	the	challenges	
faced	after	the	military	campaign,	we	cannot	deny	their	existence.	in	fact,	 initial	
military	 planning	 commenced	 in	 late	 2001.	US	central	 command	 commanding	
officer,	General	Tommy	Franks,	presented	Secretary	of	defense	donald	Rumsfeld	
an	 initial	 four‑phase	operation	plan	(designated	OPLAn	100V)	 in	december	of	
that	same	year	(Bensahel,	2006a;	Rathmell,	2005).	Through	a	counselling	process	
between	 civilian	 and	military	 leaders	 the	war	 plan	was	 gradually	 consolidated	
in	 the	 next	 several	months,	 comprising	 “post	 hostility	 operations”	 in	 its	 Phase	
iV	section	–	 i.e.	operations	 intended	 to	produce	a	 representative	government	 in	
postwar	iraq.
While	the	principal	military	aspects	were	well	established	by	mid‑2002,	civilian	
planning	was	still	in	its	preliminary	phase.	during	the	summer	of	2002	the	national	
Security	 council	 created	 an	 interagency	 executive	 Steering	 Group5	 which	 was	
responsible	 for	 planning	 and	 developing	 policy	 recommendations,	 including	 for	
humanitarian	 relief	 and	 reconstruction	 (Bensahel,	 2006a:	 455).	 in	 the	 following	
months	 preparations	 continued	 and	 in	 February	 200	 the	 general	 principles	 of	
humanitarian	relief	plans	were	being	discussed.
However,	 reconstruction	 planning	 lagged	 and	 was	 “not	 nearly	 as	 robust	 as	
the	 humanitarian	 relief	 plans,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	were	 both	 developed	 by	
the	 same	 interagency	working	 group”	 (Bensahel,	 2006a:	 456).	 The	 reason	 for	 the	
deferred reconstruction plan was twofold: first Americans believed they would be 
hailed as liberators, not as occupiers; second, and most importantly, US officials 
assumed	that	after	toppling	the	regime	the	governmental	institutions	would	continue	
to function. To all intents and purposes, officials in Washington assumed that US 
forces	would	be	acclaimed	and	“no	 large‑scale	 reconstruction	would	 therefore	be	
necessary,	since	the	new	leadership	of	iraq	would	inherit	a	functioning	and	capable	
governance	 structure”	 (Bensahel,	 2006a:	 458).	 The	 planning	 process	mirrored	 the	
political	buoyancy	in	Washington.	The	Bush	Administration,	especially	the	Secretary	
5	 The	eSG	 included	 representatives	 from	 the	State	department,	defense	department,	ciA	and	
the Office of the Vice President and was supported by a staff‑level Iraq Political‑ Military Cell 
and	several	other	working	groups.
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of	defense,	 promulgated	 a	 “light	 footprint”	 approach	 for	 State‑building	 in	 iraq6	
(Sicherman,	2007).	These	illusions	quickly	dissipated.	After	reaching	Baghdad	and	
deposing	Saddam	Hussein’s	regime,	the	postwar	situation	was	very	different	from	the	
anticipated scenarios. The first “surprise” was the absence of a major humanitarian 
crisis.7	Andrew	Rathmell	 (2005:	 102)	 attributes	 this	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Saddam	
regime	had	distributed	provisions	to	the	population	before	his	capitulation	and	the	
coalition	 forces	had	planned	 robustly	 for	 a	humanitarian	 emergency.	The	 second	
surprise	was	 the	 collapse	 of	 government	 institutions,	 particularly	 law	 and	 order	
establishments.	Actually,	US	military	action	largely	contributed	to	the	destruction	
of	the	iraqi	State:
The regime of Saddam Hussein diverted resources from the official institutions 
of the state to the flexible networks of patronage that kept it in power. Faced 
with	widespread	 lawlessness	 that	 is	 common	after	violent	 regime	change,	 the	
United	States	did	not	have	the	number	of	troops	to	control	the	situation.	After	
three	weeks	 of	 looting	 the	 state’s	 administrative	 capacity	was	 destroyed.	 (…)	
Following	the	destruction	of	government	infrastructure	across	the	country,	de‑Ba	
athification purged the civil service of its top layer of management, making 
between	 20,000	 and	 120,000	 people	 unemployed,	 removing	 its	 institutional	
memory.	(dodge,	2007:	88)
in	 fact,	 in	 iraq	 “state	 structures	 had	 the	 form,	 but	 not	 the	 substance	 of	 a	
modern	state”	(Rathmell,	2005:	1018).	even	the	administrative,	social	and	physical	
infrastructures	 were	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 imminent	 collapse.	 iraqi	 “stateness”	 only	
received	 its	 form	 due	 to	 the	 continued	 exercise	 of	 authoritarian	 force	 (Rathmell,	
2005).	The	collapse	of	the	State	led	to	third	big	surprise	–	the	emergence	of	a	violent	
insurgency.	 The	 security	 vacuum	 allowed	 for	 an	 assortment	 of	 groups	 to	wreak	
havoc	and	destruction	throughout	iraq.
The	lack	of	a	comprehensive	reconstruction	plan	became	manifest	as	State‑building	
became	the	prime	concern	for	US	policy‑makers.	According	to	George	Bush	(200)	
“Rebuilding	iraq	will	require	a	sustained	commitment	from	many	nations,	including	
our	 own”.	 For	 the	 Bush	 Administration	 State‑building	 and	 reconstruction	 went	
6	 Secretary	donald	Rumsfeld	explained	the	concept	of	“light	footprint”	in	his	February	14,	200,	
speech, stating that the US could do more with less thanks to the benefits of the Revolution in 
Military	Affairs	and	a	revised	notion	of	State‑building	acquired	with	the	war	in	Afghanistan.
7	 initial	 planning	 expected	 a	 major	 humanitarian	 crisis.	 The	 US	 and	 Un	 estimated	 that	 the	
war	 would	 displace	 over	 two	million	 people,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	more	 than	 800	 000	 already	
displaced.	The	plans	also	anticipated	the	disruption	and	possible	destruction	of	key	nodes	in	food	
distribution,	electric	and	water	supply,	and	health	services	(Bensahel,	2006).
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hand‑in‑hand	as	the	US	strategy	(national	Security	council,	2005)	looked	to	establish	
a	democratic	government	while	concurrently	rebuilding	the	foundations	for	a	sound	
economy	and	functional	social	order.	State‑building	and	reconstruction	intermingled	
causally,	becoming	the	centrepiece	of	the	US	postwar	policy.
in	effect,	the	postwar	planning	had	initially	been	attributed	to	the	department	of	
Defense, which in turn established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Affairs	 (ORHA)	 to	 coordinate	 planning	 for	 the	 administration	 of	 postwar	 iraq.	
However,	ORHA	was	deployed	to	iraq	only	two	months	after	its	conception	and	was	
under‑staffed,	under‑informed,	and	unprepared	for	the	task	at	hand.	Only	a	 little	
after	a	month	in	iraq,	ORHA	was	replaced	by	the	coalition	Provisional	Authority	
(cPA)	spearheaded	by	Paul	Bremer	iii.	The	changeover	revealed	a	drastic	change	
in	perspective,	for	“whereas	ORHA	had	been	designed	as	a	temporary	organization	
to	assist	a	new	iraqi	government	during	a	short	transition	period	of	several	months,	
CPA was an explicit occupying authority that possessed indefinite control of the 
iraqi	government”	(Bensahel,	2006a:	462).
Just	 like	 the	ORHA,	 the	cPA	was	 also	 ill	 equipped	 to	 deal	with	 the	 postwar	
reality	in	iraq.	Besides	being	in	constant	reformulation	of	its	mission,	many	of	the	
CPA’s initiatives only helped to exacerbate the difficulties of rebuilding the Iraqi 
State. The CPA’s first official decree outlawed the Ba’ath Party, crippling any attempt 
to	restore	the	iraqi	bureaucracy.	A	week	later,	the	second	decree	dissolved	the	iraqi	
army	and	other	security	organizations.	This	order	stripped	the	US	and	its	allies	of	
the	“forces	necessary	to	stabilize	the	country	and	guard	its	borders	in	the	absence	
of sufficient Coalition troops” (Sicherman, 2007: 31). More notably, the CPA failed to 
implement	an	effective	disarmament,	demobilization,	and	reintegration	(ddR)	effort.	
The	disbandment	of	the	iraqi	army	left	over	400,000	trained	military	personnel	out	of	
work	and	without	any	planned	alternatives,	contributing	to	the	mounting	insurgency	
(Bensahel,	2006b).	Furthermore,	despite	the	cPA’s	efforts	in	early	2004	to	negotiate	
a	ddR	agreement	with	the	various	local	militias,	the	outbreak	of	the	insurgencies	
of the Falluja‑based Sunni resistance and the Shiite fighters under Muqtada al‑Sadr 
in	April	2004	seriously	derailed	the	initiative	(diamond,	2004;	2006).
On	the	whole,	the	iraqis	were	never	truly	brought	into	the	reconstruction	effort.	
From	 the	 outset	 the	US	 had	determined	 the	 interlocutors	 they	would	work	with	
in	 rebuilding	 the	 iraqi	 Government.	 The	 Bush	 Administration	 initially	 favoured	
and	maintained	a	privileged	 relationship	with	 the	 iraqi	national	congress	 (inc)	
and	 its	exiled	 leader	Ahmed	chalabi.	However,	 the	obvious	 lack	of	 local	support	
and	 personal	 capabilities	 soon	 determined	 an	 alteration	 in	 the	 relationship	 and	
the	need	to	establish	relations	with	other	elites.	The	cPA	proceeded	to	create	 the	
iraqi	Governing	council	 (iGc)	in	July	200,	along	with	numerous	other	 local	and	
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provincial	organs	of	government.	Widespread	public	participation	was	dispensed	
with,	for	according	to	the	cPA	“so	long	as	someone	from	each	group	is	represented,	
and	so	long	as	even	select	groups	of	citizens	are	included	in	the	selection	process,	
the	process	 and	 the	 institutions	 are	 representative”	 (Manning,	 2006:	 729;	 see	 also	
Papagianni,	 2007).	 This	 imposition	 of	 political	 participants	 and	 representatives	
disenfranchised	the	majority	of	iraqis	and	furthered	suspicion	of	US	intentions	and	
the	political	system	it	was	implementing.
in	the	meantime,	due	to	the	lack	of	a	credible	civilian	reconstruction	effort,	the	
military	commanders	began	“undertaking	a	wide	range	of	reconstruction	activities	
out	of	necessity”	(Bensahel,	2006a:	465).	While	several	tasks	carried	out	were	ones	
in	which	military	 capabilities	 revealed	 themselves	 to	be	valuable,	many	were	 far	
beyond	their	usual	responsibilities	–	e.g.	establishing	city	councils,	justice	procedures,	
and	local	budgets	and	spending	priorities	(Idem).	Furthermore,	the	cPA	contributed	
to this lack of endogenous participation largely by rebuffing local elections in 
many	communities,	denying	a	variety	of	initiatives	that	could	have	promoted	local	
development and simultaneously mitigated some of the major identity fissures 
growing	in	iraq	(diamond,	2006).	This	policy	led	inevitably	to	disjointed	initiatives	
and	rebuilding	efforts	which	complicated	even	more	the	reconstruction	process.
The	same	is	true	for	the	economic	reconstruction	of	iraq.	contrary	to	other	sectors	
of	 the	State,	“the	design	of	 the	 future	economic	order	 in	 iraq	was	clear	early	on”	
(Lacher: 2007: 245). In fact, for US officials, the construction of a free Iraqi society 
meant first and foremost a free Iraqi economy. As Rajiv Chandrasekran (2007: 130) 
explains,	 those	 decision‑makers	 in	 Washington	 “regarded	 wholesale	 economic	
change	in	iraq	as	an	integral	part	of	the	American	mission	to	remake	the	country”.	
in	June	200	the	cPA	delineated	a	comprehensive	liberalization	of	the	iraqi	economy	
which	comprised	 the	privatization	of	socially‑owned	enterprises,	 the	end	of	State	
subsidies,	and	radical	trade	liberalization.	in	the	cPA’s	Order	number	98	it	was	
stated	 that	 “A	 foreign	 investor	 shall	 be	 entitled	 to	 make	 foreign	 investments	 in	
iraq	on	terms	no	less	favourable	than	those	applicable	to	an	iraqi	investor,	unless	
otherwise	provided	herein”,	allowing	virtually	unlimited	and	unrestricted	foreign	
investment, while placing no limitations on the expatriation of profit. But growing 
resistance	halted	the	privatization	spree.
Foreign companies did nonetheless partake in reconstruction and profit 
considerably. US companies were the main beneficiaries of government contracts, 
relegating	 iraqi	 companies	 and	 obstructing	 the	 building	 of	 local	 capacity	 for	
8	 http://www.cpa‑iraq.org/regulations/2001220_cPAORd_9_Foreign_investment_.pdf
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economic	recovery	and	combating	insurgency	(Le	Billon,	2005).	Yet,	the	liberalizing	
impetus	was	accompanied	by	an	uncoordinated	and	weakly	monitored	process	in	
which	 “dependence	on	 inexperienced	 contractors	without	 adequate	 auditing	 and	
controls led to significant corruption involving US and Iraqi officials as well as 
US contractors” (Ozlu, 2006: 25). Equally significant was the fact that the massive 
investments	 in	 infrastructure	 were	 also	 unable	 to	 produce	 the	 economic	 gains	
and	 local	development	 initially	predicted.	As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	many	 investments	
in	 infrastructure	 and	 diverse	 reconstruction	 projects	 have	 revealed	 enormous	
deficiencies and unsustainable operational costs (Looney, 2008). Consequently, 
many	 investments	 and	 reconstruction	 projects	 have	 further	 burdened	 the	 local	
economy	and	population.
Meanwhile,	the	deterioration	of	the	political	situation	in	iraq	impelled	the	Bush	
Administration	 to	 look	 for	a	 swift	 exit	 strategy.	contrary	 to	Bremer’s	opposition,	
officials in Washington advocated a rapid transfer of sovereignty to the Governing 
council,9	 along	with	 the	assignment	of	 security	 responsibilities	 to	newly	 created	
iraqi	 forces	(Sicherman,	2007).	Accordingly,	 in	november	of	200,	President	Bush	
determined	 that	 in	early	2004	 the	new	constitution	should	be	 ready,	allowing	 for	
elections briefly afterwards. Nevertheless, local political squabbling between the 
Governing	council,	 as	well	 as	 the	 augmentation	 of	 violence	 in	 early	 2004	 halted	
Washington’s	 quick	 departure.40	 The	 worsening	 of	 the	 situation	 on	 the	 ground,	
especially the intensification of the insurgency, pressed Washington to find a 
way	out.	Over‑extended	beyond	their	capabilities	US	forces	could	not	face	all	 the	
challenges. To fight‑off the uprisings and try to maintain a minimally functioning 
security	apparatus,	reconstruction	took	a	backseat.	numerous	projects	and	programs	
to	 promote	 democracy	were	 either	 put	 on	 hold	 or	 cancelled,	 demonstrating	 that	
“what	was	best	for	iraq	was	no	longer	the	standard.	What	was	best	for	Washington	
was	the	new	calculus”	(chandrasekran,	2007:	258).
The	Administration	pushed	for	a	transfer	of	sovereignty	as	soon	as	possible.	it	
took	various	 rounds	of	negotiations	with	 the	various	 local	 leaders,	 especially	 the	
mediation	 of	 Un	 special	 envoy	 Lakhdar	 Brahimi	with	 Ayatolla	 Sistani,	 to	 reach	
a compromise – i.e. an interim government would be nominated and take office 
9	 The	iraqi	Governing	council	(iGc)	was	a	25‑member	council	that	was	appointed	by	the	US	in	
July	200,	 resulting	 from	concessions	 to	 local	elites.	 it	did	not	exercise	any	real	power,	but	 it	
did	advise	the	American	Viceroy	and	nominate	iraqi	ministers,	as	well	as	proposing	timetables	
and drafting and ratification formulas for the new constitution (Diamond, 2005). 
40 Two rebellions grew in March 2004. The first occurred in Fallujah after four American security 
contractors	were	murdered	 and	 their	 bodies	mutilated.	The	other	 occurred	 after	 Sadr’s	 Shi’a	
militia	revolted	against	American	troops.
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in	 June	2004,	preparing	 for	election	of	a	 transitional	government	no	 later	 than	1	
January	 2005	 (diamond,	 2005).	 Amid	 the	 disarray	 and	 violence,	 transition	 plans	
carried	 on	 and	 on	 January	 0	 the	 election	 for	 the	 transitional	 government	 took	
place.	Subsequently,	after	drafting	and	ratifying	a	new	constitution,	elections	for	a	
new	iraqi	national	Assembly	were	held	on	december	15.41
in	the	meantime,	the	cPA	had	transferred	sovereignty	to	the	interim	government	
on	28	June	2004,	putting	an	end	to	formal	occupation.	When	the	cPA	left	many	of	
its goals were still unfulfilled. The physical infrastructure remained deficient, the 
security	apparatus	dysfunctional,	the	political	system	fragile,	and	the	daily	violence	
persistent	(chandrasekran,	2007).	The	incapacity	of	the	new	iraqi	State	to	deal	with	
the	security	situation	hampered	their	efforts	to	assert	control.	The	coalition	troops	
were	still	responsible	for	trying	to	maintain	order,	while	iraqi	military	and	police	
forces	were	gradually	assuming	increasing	responsibilities.	nonetheless,	sabotage,	
terrorism,	 rebellion	 and	 organized	 crime	 have	 plagued	 iraqi	 society	 ever	 since,	
complicating	political	and	economic	reconstruction.
Final	Comments	and	Considerations	
When	we	began	this	essay,	any	likelihood	of	uncovering	a	parallel	between	the	
policies	and	dynamics	underlying	the	reconstruction	of	the	postbellum	South	and	
iraq	was	 a	 question	 of	 serendipity.	 nevertheless,	 while	 heuristically	 surveying	
both	interventions	we	could	not	help	but	detect	a	significant	amount	of	uncanny	
resemblances.	 even	 as	 we	 recognize	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 in	 trying	 to	 extrapolate	
insights	 from	 such	 historical	 analogies	 we	 must	 speculate	 whether	 there	 are	
lessons	 to	 be	 garnered	 from	 the	 past	 and	 present	 US	 State‑building	 operations	
that	may	be	helpful	for	the	future.	This	becomes	even	more	significant	due	to	the	
fact	that	when	we	look	close	at	the	both	periods	we	come	across	more	similarities	
than	differences.
The first and most significant distinction between reconstruction in the postbellum	
South and Iraq is the fact that the former is the result of an intra‑state conflict, while 
the latter was the outcome of an inter‑state conflict initiated by the US. Contrary to 
the	civil	War,	 the	war	 in	 iraq	was	a	war	of	choice.	As	realists	 John	Mearsheimer	
and	Stephen	Walt	 (200:	 59)	 acknowledged	before	 the	war	began	“even	 if	 such	a	
41	 The	electoral	process	led	to	the	elections	of	Prime	Minister	nouri	al‑Maliki,	with	Jalal	Talabani	
as	president,	however	 the	polarization	of	power	between	 the	ethno‑sectarian	parties	delayed	
the agreement on a Cabinet for five months.
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war	 goes	 well	 and	 has	 positive	 long‑range	 consequences,	 it	 will	 still	 have	 been	
unnecessary”.
The	geographical	complexities	underlying	both	interventions	were	also	unique.	
despite	 many	 opinions	 to	 the	 contrary	 the	 integration	 of	 north	 and	 South	 was	
favoured	by	a	shared	identity.	Any	division	caused	by	the	war	could	not	erase	the	
past	relationships:
For	all	of	 their	distinctiveness,	 the	Old	South	and	north	were	complementary	
elements	 in	 an	 American	 society	 that	 was	 everywhere	 primarily	 rural,	
capitalistic, materialistic, and socially stratified, racially, ethnically, and 
religiously	heterogeneous,	and	stridently	chauvinistic	and	expansionist.	(Pessen,	
1980:1149)
in	iraq	the	situation	was	much	more	complex,	with	greater	cultural	and	political	
diversity	complicating	reconstruction.	Personal	loyalties	were	based	on	ethnic	and	
clan affiliation. This cultural and political division was artificially bundled together 
under	 a	 century	 ago	 by	 foreign	 powers.	 Besides	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 democratic	 legacy	
and	 institutions	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 State	 could	 only	 be	 preserved	 by	 force.	despite	
its	political	discrimination	and	 intolerance	 towards	slaves,	 the	South	already	had	
a	democratic	tradition	as	well	as	democratic	institutions.
equally	 distinguishable	 was	 the	 transition	 of	 political	 power.	 Although	 both	
interventions defeated the dominant political group there is a significant consequential 
distinction.	in	the	South	intervention	tried	to	give	power	to	a	minority,	whereas	in	
iraq	the	reassignment	of	political	power	was	to	the	majority	group.
But	 by	 and	 large,	 in	 our	 perspective,	 the	 two	 interventions	 have	many	more	
features	 in	 common.	 Both	 interventions	 were	 initiated	 due	 to	 national	 security	
concerns.	While	Lincoln	fought	to	preserve	the	Union	from	dismemberment,	Bush	
sought	 to	 curtail	 Saddam	Hussein’s	 access	 to	weapons	 of	mass	 destruction.	 The	
progression of both conflicts eventually developed into a program of emancipation, 
in	which	the	liberation	of	an	oppressed	community	became	the	acknowledged	end	
result	 –	 i.e.	 the	 political	 liberation	 of	 slaves	 in	 the	 South	 and	 the	 oppressed	 and	
tyrannized	 iraqi	population.	despite	original	 intentions,	 in	each	case	 the	political	
discourse	 evolved	 into	 one	 in	 which	 “the	 US	 attempted	 to	 politically	 empower	
a	 previously	 disenfranchised	 people	 through	 democratic	 reform”	 (Leavey,	 2006:	
6‑7).	
in	the	South	and	in	iraq	strong	moral	convictions	pressed	this	spirit	of	liberation.	
Nevertheless, in both cases this approach backfired, as local populations did not 
recognize	the	legitimacy	of	the	occupier.	Andrea	Talentino	(2007:	15)	has	alerted	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 local	 perceptions	 may	 impede	 State‑building	 initiatives	 because	
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“actors	resist	change,	even	when	they	might	objectively	agree	that	it	is	positive,	if	
it	seems	forced	upon	them”.	consequently,	in	the	postbellum	South	as	well	as	in	iraq	
the	end	of	military	operations	did	not	signify	the	end	of	violence.	The	insurgency	
in Iraq is equivalent to the political resistance and terrorist activities identified in 
the	years	of	Reconstruction.42
History	seems	 to	demonstrate	 that	political	 leaders	 look	 for	 the	swiftest	 route	
to	 solving	 their	 problems.	 Lincoln,	 Johnson	 and	 Bush	 all	 sought	 swift	 political	
solutions.	But	while	the	19th	century	Presidents	tried	to	include	former	adversaries	in	
a	compromising	solution,	Bush,	just	like	the	Radical	Republicans	before	him,	strived	
to proscribe opponents – i.e. Ba ath Party members. The quick‑fix solution depicts 
one	 of	 the	 fundamental	misgivings	 of	 Southern	 and	 iraqi	 reconstruction	 projects	
–	the	political	unwillingness	or	incapacity	to	truly	commit	to	the	transformational	
experiment.	neither	the	Radical	Republicans	nor	the	Bush	Administration4	were	able	
or	prepared	to	consign	the	resources	required	to	enforce	their	political	agendas.
At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 local	 governing	 bodies	 were	 imposed	 in	 the	 Southern	
States	 and	 iraq,	 endogenous	 resentment	 augmented.	 if	 the	 imposition	 of	 local	
governments	did	not	alienate	local	populations,	the	ineffectiveness	of	their	actions	
surely	did.	The	requirements	 for	 those	responsible	 for	 local	reconstruction	were	
questionable	at	best.	deficient	planning	and	lack	of	coordination	amplified	these	
shortcomings	 (Rathmell,	2007).	We	can	exempt	Radical	Reconstruction	 for	some	
of	the	inadequacies	due	to	the	lack	of	prior	experience	in	reconstruction	projects.	
nevertheless,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 iraq,	 the	 US	 has	 a	 long	 history	 of	 State‑building	
endeavours	 from	which	 to	 have	 learned	 some	valuable	 lessons44	 (dobbins	 et al,	
2008;	200).	The	key	flaw	though	in	the	Bush	Administration’s	planning	can	almost	
certainly	 be	 attributed	 to	 an	 optimistic	 outlook	 preceding	 the	 initial	 military	
intervention.	As	Sicherman	 (2007:	5)	points	out	“Hope	was	many	 things,	but	a	
policy	it	was	not”.
in	the	postbellum	South	congress	and	the	President	wrestled	for	control	of	 the	
reconstruction	 process.	 The	 Bush	 Administration’s	 control	 of	 the	 State‑building	
experiment	 in	iraq	was	never	 in	question.	Yet	on	the	ground	there	was	no	power	
42	 in	 iraq	 the	 insurgency	can	count	on	 foreign	assistance,	while	 the	violent	groups	 in	 the	South	
did	not	share	this	support.
4	 The	Obama	Administration	 has	 already	demonstrated	 that	 is	 too	 also	 looking	 to	 pull	 out	 of	
iraq,	concentrating	their	State‑building	efforts	in	Afghanistan.	
44 The US officials responsible for reconstruction in Iraq made things even more difficult as they 
allowed	bureaucratic	disputes	to	prevent	it	from	using	the	expertise	in	the	State	department	and	
other	national	and	international	institutions,	such	as	the	Un,	to	help	them	in	their	State‑building	
endeavours	(Rathmell,	2005).
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overseeing the State‑building enterprise. Military commanders and civilian officials 
reported	 to	 different	 hierarchies	 and	 there	 were	 few	 organizational	 linkages.	
Some	orders	countered	other	organizations	orders	and	created	a	sometimes	tense	
environment between military officers and civilian officials. In fact, in Iraq “there 
was	 no	 one	 in	 the	 theatre	 who	 was	 responsible	 for	 both”	 military	 and	 civilian	
operations	(Bensahel,	2006a:	465).
The	 promise	 and	 hope	 of	 economic	 development	was	 also	 hampered	 in	 both	
historical	cases.	State‑building	and	estate‑building	went	hand	in	hand	in	the	South	
and Iraq. Economic reconstruction was plagued by difficulties due to the continued 
violence	 and	 alleged	 corruption.	 Moreover,	 the	 local	 communities	 gained	 little	
from	 the	 existing	 economic	 development.	 Whereas	 after	 the	 civil	 War	 Radical	
Reconstruction	“shifted	the	terms	of	trade	against	agriculture	in	favor	of	industry	
and	centralized	control	of	credit	in	the	hands	of	leading	new	York	banks”	(Foner,	
1997:	95),	so	did	Reconstruction	contracts	in	iraq	favour	large	American	corporations.	
in	fact,	active	indigenous	participation	in	the	political	and	physical	reconstruction	
was	 residual	 in	 both	 situations.	 Local	 representatives	 were	 designated	 by	 the	
occupying forces and lacked legitimacy, exacerbating the difficulties of restoring 
order	and	providing	hope.
Another	similarity	between	both	projects	of	reconstruction	was	the	reservation	
in relation to the newly liberated people’s ability to appreciate and benefit from 
their newly acquired political rights. When the difficulties pressed for a way out, US 
officials and intelligentsia considered whether the gift of freedom and democracy 
was	appropriate.	in	the	South	it	was	questioned	whether	black	people	were	ready	
and	 capable	 of	 receiving	 a	 formal	 education	 and	 political	 freedom.	 Similarly,	
doubts	surged	as	to	whether	the	iraqis	were	prepared	for	democracy	and	political	
independence.
equally	 analogous	 is	 the	 Americans	 continued	 trust	 in	 military	 solutions	 to	
State‑building challenges. Many analysts and officials defend that without strong 
military	involvement	any	State‑building	effort	 is	destined	to	be	defeated	(Leavey,	
2006;	Ottaway,	2002).	However,	many	times	the	emphasis	on	the	military	dimensions	
hampers the final political objectives. Rupert Smith (2008) has demonstrated the 
intertwined nature of contemporary conflicts and suggests we reflect on the utility 
of	 force.	The	historical	 record	of	US	State‑Building	 initiatives	has	cautioned	us	 to	
the	over	reliance	on	military	solutions	to	political	objectives.
in	 the	 same	 way,	 popular	 support	 for	 the	 interventions	 withered	 in	 both	
instances.	in	the	19th	century	the	north	gradually	lost	its	enthusiasm	for	the	Radical	
program.	in	the	case	of	iraq,	international	support	was	absent	almost	from	the	start.	
eventually,	 the	mounting	death	 toll	of	American	 troops	and	 the	souring	costs	on	
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public	expenditure	changed	US	public	attitude	towards	the	State‑building	adventure,	
mobilizing	a	large	public	demand	for	the	return	home	of	US	troops.
Amitai	etzioni	 (2007:	27)	 states	 that	 reconstruction	should	be	understood	as	a	
“restoration	of	the	conditions	of	the	assets	and	infrastructure	of	an	occupied	nation	or	
territory”	to	the	status quo	ante”.	nevertheless,	the	reconstruction	projects	undertaken	
by	the	US	did	not	 look	to	restore	the	previously	existing	political	order.	Quite	on	
the	contrary,	the	secular	State‑building	experiments	of	the	US	have	culminated	in	
the	institutionalization	of	“a	new	cartography	in	the	struggle	to	remake	the	global	
map in very particular ways and in support of very specific class and locational 
interests”	 (Smith,	 2004:	 2).	Both	Radical	Reconstruction	and	 the	War	 in	 iraq	 can	
be	best	understood	 in	 the	 framework	of	 the	 contemporary	peacebuilding	project,	
“which	 in	 itself	 has	 been	 subsumed	 within	 a	 liberal	 state‑building	 enterprise”	
(Richmond,	2008:	105).	in	fact,	both	sought	radical	transformations	of	the	existing	
political,	social	and	economic	orders.	
consequently,	 it	seems	that	Kagan’s	(2006)	account	that	the	US	civil	War	was	
America’s first experiment in State‑building should not be dismissed nonchalantly. 
Given	some	intellectual	leeway,	the	civil	War	can	be	seen	as	initiating	a	“massive,	
interventionary,	 process	 of	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 engineering”	which	we	
nowadays	designate	as	“state‑building	and	 its	association	with	 the	 liberal	peace”	
(Richmond,	 2008:	 114).	 in	 this	 sense,	 as	 the	 historical	 analogy	 presented	 reveals,	
the	different	US	State‑building	endeavours	can	only	be	understood	as	a	top‑down	
initiative.	 Any	 attempt	 to	 concede	 the	 state‑building	 project	 to	 the	 different	
indigenous	 actors	 may	 lead	 to	 an	 undesired	 attempt	 for	 emancipation	 from	 the	
intended	grand	liberal	scheme.
For	 many	 decades	 postbellum	 Reconstruction	 in	 the	 South	 “represented	 the	
ultimate	shame	of	the	American	people”	(Stammp,	1970:	4).	Similar	remarks	have	
been	asserted	in	recent	times	in	regard	to	the	American	State‑building	experiment	
in	iraq.	international	zeitgeist	will	not	absolve	the	US	intervention	in	iraq	any	time	
soon. Even some of the more hawkish figures associated with American foreign 
policy	have	assailed	the	George	W.	Bush	Administration’s	course	of	action.	Today’s	
political	 imperative	 is	 a	 quiet	 exit	 strategy	 out	 of	 iraq.	What	 kind	of	 State	 is	 left	
behind	 seems	 to	 matter	 little.	 disappointment	 and	 weariness	 have	 calmed	 the	
State‑building	debate	for	the	time	being.	
But	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 history	 of	 US	 intervention	 in	 iraq	will	 one	 day	 be	
examined	 in	 a	different	 light.	Will	 there	 be	 a	 revisionist	 history	 of	 the	American	
State‑building	 experiment	 in	 iraq?	 Will	 it	 vindicate	 the	 intervention	 or	 further	
condemn	 it	 and	 those	 responsible?	 it	 should	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	 traditional	
interpretation	 of	 postbellum	 Reconstruction	 was	 radically	 altered.	 As	 eric	 Foner	
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(1997:	 98)	 reminds	us,	many	 a	 revisionists’	 verdict	 is	 “that	 if	Reconstruction	was	
a	 tragic	 era,	 it	 was	 so	 because	 change	 did	 not	 go	 far	 enough”.	 in	 this	 outlook,	
reconstruction	 fell	 short	 of	 its	 potential	 by	 not	 pursuing	 enthusiastically	 enough	
in	its	transformational	agenda.
Recent	events	have	spurred	many	to	re‑evaluate	the	democratizing	experiment	
in	iraq.	The	12	June,	2009	iranian	elections	and	the	ensuing	uprisings	have	led	many	
commentators	and	analysts	to	rejoice	with	a	renewed	sense	of	hope	regarding	the	
liberal	peace	project.	not	all	go	as	far	as	daniel	Finkelstein	(2009)	who	states	that	
“what	we	are	seeing	on	the	streets	of	iran	now	is	a	vindication	of	[the]	neoconservative	
ideas”.	But	democratic	enthusiasm	has	returned,	although	with	some	nuances.
Lessons	from	the	past	seem	to	have	been	learned	as	New York Times	columnist	
david	Brooks	 (2009)	 recognizes	 that	 there	 are	 no	 formulas	 for	 undermining	 frail	
regimes	and	“there	are	no	circumstances	in	which	the	United	States	has	been	able	
to	 peacefully	 play	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 another	 nation’s	 revolution”.	 nevertheless,	
the	 US	 does	 have	many	 tools	 for	 supporting	 local	 democratic	movements	 –	 e.g.	
media,	 technical	 advice,	 cultural	 and	 economic	 sanctions,	 presidential	 visits	 for	
key	 dissidents,	 embracing	 of	 democratic	 values,	 and	 condemnation	 of	 regimes	
barbarities.	 These,	 he	 insists,	 should	 all	 be	 used	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 the	 iranian	
regimes	collapse,	for	“hastening	that	day	is	now	the	central	goal”	(Idem).
Rathmell	 (2005:	 107)	 has	 concluded	 that	 iraq	 is	 not	 the	 model	 for	 future	
operations	for	“the	assumption	of	all	government	functions	by	occupying	forces	
in	the	aftermath	of	a	coercive	regime	change	in	such	large	and	conflicted	country	
will	be	a	 rare	occurrence”.	This	may	be	so,	but	 the	US	will	 certainly	pursue	 the	
global	 diffusion	 of	 its	 political	 project.	 in	 fact,	 if	 the	 historical	 analogy	 in	 this	
essay	reveals	anything,	 it	 is	that	there	is	a	distinguishable	historical	pattern	and	
dynamic	 of	 actively	 and	 forcefully	 imposing	 a	 specific	 political	 agenda	 in	 US	
postwar	interventions.
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